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PATENTS, TAXES, AND THE NUCLEAR
OPTION: DO WE NEED A "TAX STRATEGY
PATENT" BAN TREATY?
Max Stu/ Oppenheimert

I. INTRODUCTION

Periodically, as industries discover that the patent statute applies to them,
1
there are calls for industry-specific exemptions or special treatment. The tax
planning industry is the latest to encounter the patent system, and has reacted
according to the general pattern. The reaction is all the more understandable in
this particular case, where tax practitioners may be more comfortable with the
concept of an industry-specific exception than would patent practitioners:
patent law is a system ofbroad principles and few specific exceptions. 2
Following the initial reaction, though, industries typically adapt to the
patent system and incorporate patents as part of their business model. For
example, the biotech industry languished until the Supreme Court held that
patent law extended to living inventions. 3 Today, the 360 largest biotech
t Princeton University, BS cum laude; Harvard Law School, JD; Associate Professor, University of
Baltimore School of Law, Faculty, The Johns Hopkins University. I would like to thank my research assistant,
Ara Hacopian, VB 2008 and my colleague, Professor Wendy Gerzog for her comments on the tax aspects of
this article.
I. For example, the Patent Office initially took the position that software was not patentable.
Examination of Patent Applications on Computer Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 15,609, 15,609-10 (Oct. 22, 1968).
When the Supreme Court held that software could be patentable subject matter, concerns were expressed that
allowing software to be patented would have a debilitating effect on the software industry (and would require
the Patent Office to process thousands of additional applications). Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587-88
(1978). When the Supreme Court held that living organisms could be patentable subject matter, it was argued
that genetic patents should not be issued because "the dangers are far too substantial .... " Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,316 (1980).
2. Atomic Weapons are the only category of invention completely excluded from patent eligibility.
The exclusion is contained, not in the patent statute, but in the Atomic Energy Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (a)
(2000). There is also one category of invention (medical procedures) as to which patents are available but
infringement remedies are denied. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000). There are also special defenses to infringement
of business method patents for certain users./d. § 273(b)(l). In addition, any patent may be condemned before
issue if its publication would jeopardize national security. See Max Stu! Oppenheimer, Harmonization
Through Condemnation: Is New London the Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445,
493-95 (2007) (discussing takings of patents by eminent domain). If, the patent is condemned, however, the
invention is simply taken by eminent domain, and compensation is paid in lieu of issuing the patent. Farrand
Optical v. U.S., 317 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1962).
3. Council for Responsible Genetics, DNA Patents Create Monopolies on Living Organisms (Apr.
2000), http://www.actionbioscience.org/genomic/crg.html.
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companies have a market cap over $500 billion, 4 and the first biotech
company, Genentech, alone generates more than $9 billion in revenue annually
and employs more than 10,000 people. 5 Software companies, which once
thought software unpatentable, now generate annual patent licensing revenue
in the billions. 6 Even if the tax planning industry does not experience growth
on this scale, it is unlikely that tax strategy patents will pose a threat to the
industry. As a system that can grant government sanctioned monopolies, the
patent statute includes significant hurdles to patentability to ensure that such
monopolies are granted only in exchange for meaningful contributions. 7 Those
hurdles are particularly well-suited to deal with tax strategy patents.
To explain why tax strategy patents pose no serious threat, this article
begins with a brief history of the emergence of and reactions to tax strategy
patents, followed by an overview of the U.S. patent system's objectives and
methods. Then this article traces how a tax strategy patent application would
be handled by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") and, if issued,
the rights it would confer on its owner, and concludes that tax strategy patents
are likely to be valueless. Finally, suggestions are offered for helping to assure
that the patent system responds appropriately in evaluating tax strategy patent
applications.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF TAX STRATEGY PATENTS

A. The Legal Basis for Tax Strategy Patents
Patents are only available for certain categories of advances, 8 enumerated
in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides: "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent. ... " 9 There are no
special subcategories-machines, manufactures, compositions of matter and
processes may be patented if the claimed invention meets the remaining
statutory criteria, while things that are not machines, manufactures,
compositions of matter or processes may not be patented even if the claimed
invention meets the remaining criteria. 10 Early cases drew a distinction

4. Reports Highlight Recent Developments from Burrill & Company, 2007 LIFE Sci. WKLY. 4380 (June
26, 2007).
5. GENENTECH, GENENTECH 2006 ANNUAL REPORT § 3 (2006), available at http://www.gene.com/
gene/ir/financials/annual-reports/2006/2006annualreport.pdf.
6. In 2006, IBM alone earned more than $1 billion in royalty revenue, largely from software patents.
IBM, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/annualreport/2006/2006_ibm_annual.pdf.
7. 35 u.s.c. § 101.
8. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) ("[N]o patent is available for a
discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories of
patentable subject matter of35 U.S.C. § 101 .... ").
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
I 0. Other countries have created technology-specific exclusions from patentability. The most common
are computer software and biotechnology industries in which U.S. companies hold dominant positions and
which are major contributors to the U.S. economy. See, e.g., European Patent Convention art. 52(2) (limiting
patent protection for software); European Patent Convention art. 53 (limiting patent protection for
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between invention and mere observation of a natural phenomenon, holding
only the former patentable. 11 Over time, in an effort to provide practical
guidance on locating the dividing line, the circuit courts, including the Court of
Claims and Patent Appeals, a predecessor of the Federal Circuit, proposed
certain bright line tests, each of which at one time was identified as a category
that was unpatentable per se. 12
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court rejected one such bright
line category, living matter. 13 In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, the Federal Circuit noted the breadth of the Chakrabarty
decision and concluded that business methods, like living organisms could
satisfy the patentable subject matter requirement, and therefore a patent that
met the other requirements of the statute was not invalid solely because it
related to accomplishing a business objective. 14 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari, 15 and has not spoken on the subject of patentable subject matter
.
16
smce.
To date, one case has been filed alleging infringement of a tax strategy
patent. On May 20, 2003, the USPTO issued U.S. Patent 6,567,790 for "Estate
Planning Method for Minimizing Tax Liability," claiming the use of stock
options to fund a grantor retained-annuity trust. 17 The patentee sued for the
unlicensed use of the technique, and the case was settled by a consent decree
that left open the question of patent validity. 18
B. The Patent Office Response

Following the State Street decision, the USPTO has granted patents on
business methods 19 in a variety of fields, and Congress has enacted special
rules allowing competitors to continue to use patented business methods under

biotechnology). See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 2 at 454 n. 36 (noting other examples of exclusions
from patentability).
II. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (stating that patents
cannot be issued for the discovery of nature).
12. See infra Part III.D.l (discussing the patent office's rejection of claims to inventions using
mathematical algorithms).
13. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,318 (1980).
14. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
15. !d.
I 6. In an earlier case, the Court declined to discuss the section I 0 I argument concerning a computerized
financial record-keeping system, holding the patent invalid under section 103 instead. Dann v. Johnston, 425
U.S. 219, 225 (1976). A dissent in the decision to dismiss certiorari in Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Lab., Inc., suggests that the Federal Circuit may have gone too far in expanding the reach of
patentable subject matter. 548 U.S. 124, 124-39 (2006) (Bryer, J., dissenting). See irifi"a Part IILD (arguing
that the Supreme Court never intended to create an expansive, fourth category of subject matter excluded from
Section 101).
I7. U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. I, 1999).
18. Wealth Transfer Group, LLC v. Rowe, No. 3-06 Civ. 24 (D. Conn. Mar. 9, 2007).
19. The USPTO has published a white paper that traces the history of business method patents and lists
a sampling of such patents. See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A USPTO WHITE PAPER:
AUTOMATED FINANCIAL OR MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS) (2000),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menulbusmethp/whitepaper.doc.
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certain circumstances. 20
One of the challenges for examination of tax strategy applications is the
difficulty of finding relevant prior art. 21 This is a challenge the USPTO has
faced before, and is not unique to tax strategies, but is inherent in fields of
rapidly developing technology.
In response to the 1998 decision in State Street, the USPTO began
planning changes in operation, tripling the number of examiners assigned to
the unit examining business method applications, and identifying new
databases to be searched in determining patentability. 22 By 2001, the USPTO
could report that:
82 examiners work in workgroup 2160. This is an increase of 47
examiners since the beginning of Fiscal Year 2000. To achieve this
increase, an examiner work assignment program was initiated that
brought 36 experienced examiners from other areas of the USPTO that
had an interest and the necessary backgrounds in the business method
area ..... The majority of the examiners in Class 705 [the class in
which business method patents would be classified] have data
processing and computer education or experience. Other educational
and business industry work experience includes the fields of Banking,
Securities, Business Development, Marketing Analysis, Real Estate
Analysis, Business Consulting, Management, Sales, Insurance,
Business Information Systems, and Financial Analysis. Additionally,
30 examiners have advanced or multiple degrees, 12 have law degrees,
7 have Ph.D. and 21 have their Masters Degree (including 6 examiners
with an MBA). 23
There was a learning curve, manifested in a longer than average delay in
initially acting on business method patents while the USPTO adjusted, but by
the end of 2001 the average pendency of a business method application was
within three months of the overall USPTO average. 24
The USPTO recently reported that applications for business method
patents rose from 1,500 in 1998 (the year that State Street was decided) to over
9,000 in 2006 and outlined its plans for the area, 25 including steps specifically
20. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000) (providing a defense to patent infringement for users of the patented method
whose use predated the filing date of the patent by at least one year).
21. See, e.g., Dustin Stamper, Tax Strategy Patents: A Problem Without a Solution?, 115 TAX NOTES
300, 302 (2007) (noting difficulties at the USPTO in novelty and non-obviousness inquiries).
22. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 19, at 9. In the two years since the Federal Circuit
decision to the publication of the White Paper, the USPTO increased the number of examiners in Class 705
from twelve to thirty-eight, and reported that "[ s ]eventeen of the 38 examiners have advanced or multiple
degrees. Of these 4 have an MBA or other business degrees, 4 have a JD degree, 4 have Ph.D. degrees, and 7
have Masters Degrees." !d. The USPTO had also identified databases of non-patent literature, which
examiners are to consult in addition to searching the patent database. !d. at 15.
23. WYNN COGGINS, BUSINESS METHODS STILL EXPERIENCING SUBSTANTIAL GROWTH- REPORT OF
FISCAL YEAR 2001 STATISTICS (2002), http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/fy2001strport.html.
24. !d. ''The average pendency to first action in Class 705 is 23.5 months. This can be compared to an
average pendency to first action of 14.6 months for the entire USPTO. The average time to disposal is 28.5
months in Class 705. This can be compared to an average time to disposal of 25.6 months for the entire
USPTO." !d.
25. WYNN W. COGGINS, UPDATE ON BUSINESS METHODS FOR THE BUSINESS PARTNERSHIP MEETING
(2007), available at http://www.mielelawgroup.com/fileslbusiness%20methods%pto%20presentation.pdf.
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directed to tax strategy patent applications. Among those steps, the USPTO
26
established an examination subclass dedicated to tax strategy patents and
partnered with the Internal Revenue Service "to pursue training and
. fiormat10n
. exchange .... ,27
m
The problems posed for examination of tax strategy patent applications
are reminiscent of those faced by the USPTO in examining software
applications. In 1999, the USPTO held hearings seeking help in designing a
strategy for dealing with prior art in the then-emerging field of software
patents. 28 Assistant Secretary Dickinson commented: "The challenge that we
have before us is a challenge for certain emerging technologies. For some, we
suspect that the databases and resources the USPTO relies on may be not
enough to enable the patent examiner to find the best, relevant and current
prior art. 29 " Thus, though tax strategy applications will present specific unique
problems, 30 the general problem of developing new search strategies and
establishing new organizations to handle new technologies has been solved.
C. The Concerns of the Tax Bar

On February 16, 2007 Senators Levin, Coleman and Obama introduced
the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, which would limit patents on "invention[s]
designed to minimize, avoid, deter, or otherwise affect liability for Federal,
State, local or foreign tax .... " 31
Senator Levin's comments introducing the bill reflecting many of the
concerns of the tax bar:

From 2001-2007, the number of examiners increased from seventy-seven to 197. !d. Within the finance arts
section of business methods, the USPTO had sixty-eight examiners and planned to add thirty-seven more
examiners in the area by end of fiscal year 2007 and "[t]he USPTO currently has a proposal before the Office
of Personnel Management that would allow the USPTO to pilot [sic] hiring patent examiners with specific
backgrounds in finance, tax and insurance." !d.
26. !d. (explaining that the director identified 60 issued patents related to tax strategy and 86 published
applications, which had not yet been examined).
27. !d.
28. Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, PTO to Hold Separate Hearings on Computer
Software Patents and Native American Insignia Trademarks (July 13, 1999), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/99-2l.htm.
29. Public Hearing on Issues Related to the Identification of Prior Art During the Examination of
Patent Application, Before the United States Department of Commerce Patent and Trademark Office ( 1999)
(statement of Todd Dickenson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce), available at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
com!hearings/priorartlpri or_art !.doc.
30. The tax bar has tended to keep many strategies secret, even resorting to confidentiality agreements
prohibiting clients from disclosing strategies. See, e.g., 67 Fed. Reg. 64,799 (Oct. 22, 2002) (discussing
confidential tax shelters). This approach presents special risks for patentability. See infra Part III.
31. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Carl Levin, Coleman, Obama Introduce Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (Feb.
17, 2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/-levin/newsroom/releasecfm?id=269479 [hereinafter Press
Release, Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act]. The administrative problems of this approach would appear
insurmountable. For example, the patent at issue in State Street, which opened the door for all business
method patents, would fall under the proposed ban. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc.,
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Business method patents are presumably unobjectionable-Congress has
implicitly recognized their validity by providing a special defense to infringement of business method patents
but not withdrawing the USPTO's authority to issue them. See infra note 117; infra Part IV (discussing
upholding a business method patent and tax strategy patents).
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32

1. The fear that tax shelter patents might increase abusive activities
2. The fear that the patent office is not equipped to evaluate tax strategy
patents 33
3. The fear that owners of tax strategy patents might misrepresent the
patent as a government endorsement of the underlying strategy 34
4. The fear that owners of tax strategy patents could charge a fee for use
of the patene 5
5. The fear that patents would provide incentives for innovation in a field
.
.
36
where sueh mcentlves are unnecessary.
A similar set of concerns was catalogued by Ellen Aprill, Associate Dean
for Academic Programs at Loyola Law School, at the ABA annual meeting. 37
To summarize:
1. "The benefit of our patent system . . . is the encouragement of
innovation . . . . [M]any tax practitioners suggest that no such incentive is
required to encourage development of new tax strategies"; 38
2. "the patent holder, rather than Congress, would decide eligibility for
obtaining a tax advantage"; 39
3. "patents are not a government seal of approval, although they are often
seen- and may be marketed- as such"; 40
32. Press Release, Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, supra note 31 ("Section 303 of our bill addresses the
growing problem of tax shelter patents, which has the potential for significantly increasing abusive tax shelter
activities.").
33. !d. ("[T]ax strategy patents ... [are] issued by patent officers who, by statute, have a background in
science and technology, not tax law, and know little to nothing about abusive tax shelters.").
34. !d. ("Patents issued for aggressive tax strategies, for example, may enable unscrupulous promoters
to claim the patent represents an official endorsement of the strategy and evidence that it would withstand IRS
challenge.").
35. !d. ("If a single tax practitioner is the first to discover an advantage granted by the law and secures a
patent for it, that person could then effectively charge a toll for all other taxpayers to use the same strategy,
even though as a matter of public policy all persons ought to be able to take advantage of the law to minimize
their taxes.").
36. !d. ("In the tax arena, however, there has historically been ample incentive for innovation in the
form ofthe tax savings alone. The last thing we need is a further incentive for aggressive tax shelters."). It is
ironic that the proposal to introduce a special interest exception into the patent law was made in the same bill
that sought to reduce abuses of special interest exceptions in the tax statute.
Here's just one simplified example of the gimmicks being used by corporations to transfer taxable
income from the United States to tax havens to escape taxation. Suppose a profitable U.S. corporation
establishes a shell corporation in a tax haven. The shell corporation has no office or employees, just a
mailbox address. The U.S. parent transfers a valuable patent to the shell corporation. Then, the U.S.
parent and all of its subsidiaries begin to pay a hefty fee to the shell corporation for use of the patent,
reducing its U.S. income through deducting the patent fees and thus shifting taxable income out of the
United States to the shell corporation. The shell corporation declares a portion of the fees as profit, but
pays no U.S. tax since it is a tax haven resident. The icing on the cake is that the shell corporation can
then 'lend' the income it has accumulated from the fees back to the U.S. parent for its use. The parent,
in tum, pays 'interest' on the 'loans' to the shell corporation, shifting still more taxable income out of
the United States to the tax haven. This example highlights just a few of the tax haven ploys being
used by some U.S. corporations to escape paying their fair share of taxes here at home.
Statement of Senator Carl Levin on Introducing the Stop Tax Haven Act, Part I, Feb. 17, 2007,
http :1/levin. senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfin?id=269514.
37. See generally Ellen P. Aprill, Responding to Tax Strategy Patents (2007) available at
http ://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_id=98034 7.
38. !d. at 5.
39. !d. at 7.
40. !d. at 9.
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4. "[a]s a result of the difficulties in identifying prior art, tax practitioners
are concerned that many of the patents that have or will be issued for tax
strategies will inevitably involve techniques that have long been accepted as
41
routine"; and
5. "The proliferation of tax strategy patents would also affect professional
culture. Historically, the dissemination of tax planning ideas has been open
42
and widespread. "
On April 20, 2007, the incoming chair of the ABA Section of Taxation
stated that the section's highest priority would be fighting patenting of tax
strategies, which the chair characterized as "a threat to the American tax
system." 43
Much of the concern arises from a misunderstanding of the patent system,
which is nearly as complex (although considerably more rational) than the tax
system. 44 Some of the concern is attributable to the inherent lag between the
emergence of a new technology and the practical ability of the legal system to
45
respond, a problem not unique to the patent system.
To the extent the
concerns are substantive, they are the intended result of a system whose origins
46
trace to the Constitution and to the first Congress.
Though the concern of the tax bar has focused on the question of whether
tax strategy patents are statutory subject matter, a patent will be denied if the
47
application fails any of the statutory requirements.
In analyzing the
concerns, it will be helpful to have a brief overview of the constitutional and
statutory authority, goals, and methods of the patent system.
Ill. THE PATH (AND HURDLES) FACING A TAX STRATEGY PATENT APPLICATION
A. The Basic Rules of the Patent System

The power to create a patent system arises under Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution, which grants Congress the power to reward invention by granting
48
The power is exercised in
monopolies on the invention for a limited time.
41. !d. at 14. The patent statute denies patentability to such applications, but the concern is that the
patent office will fail to find the prior art, which would lead to denial of the application. In this case, the
issued patent could still be invalidated by litigation, although it is a valid concern that the cost of such
litigation raises the cost of using the patented strategy.
42. !d. at 19.
43. Alison Bennett, Chairman-Elect of ABA Section of Taxation Vows to Fight Patenting of Tax
Strategies, PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT DAILY (BNA), Apr. 24, 2007.
44. The patent statute has never required a simplification act. Cf Tax Reduction and Simplification Act
of 1977, P.L. 95-30, 91 Stat. 39 (1997); Reporting Simplification Act of 2006, P.L. 109-280, 120 Stat. 1057
(2006).
45. Manav Tanneeru, Legislation Can't Keep Pace with Technology, CNN.COM, Oct. 18, 2005,
www .cnn.com/2005/TECH/ I 0/17 /wireless.legislation/index.htrnl.
46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries ... ").
47. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE 2100.5 (8th ed. 2007) [hereinafter MPEP].
48. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. For a detailed analysis of how the clause entered the Constitution, see
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Title 35 of the U.S. Code. 49 Regulations are contained in Title 37 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, 50 and specific internal rules governing the examination
of patent applications are contained in the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure ("MPEP"). 51
In order to receive a patent, an inventor must file an application with the
52
USPTO.
The application is reviewed by a patent examiner for compliance
with the patent statute, which requires, among other things, a determination
that the claimed invention: 53
1. is statutory subject matter, i.e., falls within at least one of the
followinf.t categories: machine, manufacture, composition of matter or
process;
2. is useful, 55 meaning, under current patent office rules, that the claimed
invention has a "specific, substantial, and credible use"; 56
3. is novel, 57 meaning that it was not in the public domain 58 before the
later of the applicant's date of invention or one year prior to the effective date
of the applicant's patent application filing. 59
4. would not be considered obvious by someone of ordinary skill in the
field 60 who, under the rules of the patent statute, is presumed to have complete
knowledge of the prior art; 61
5. is described and illustrated in the application in sufficient detail to
teach someone of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the invention; 62
6. discloses the best way of carrying out the invention; 63 and
7. is claimed in a sufficiently specific manner to apprise the public ofthe
scope of the claimed patent monopoly. 64

Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and UsefUl Arts: The Background and Origin of
the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. I ( 1994 ).
49. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (2000).
50. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.997 (2007).
51. MPEP, supra note 47, at 700.1 - .334.
52. 35 U.S.C. § Ill (a)(!).
53. It is important to note that what is examined and may ultimately be protected by a patent is the
"claimed invention," not the underlying or background concepts. MPEP, supra note 47, at 2100-6. Many of
the concerns expressed about tax strategy patents disappear when the analysis focuses on what is actually
claimed as opposed to what is described in the application.
54. 35 U.S.C. § 101; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) ("[N]o patent is
available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express
categories of patentable subject matter of35 U.S.C. § 101 .... ").
55. 35 U.S.C. § I 01.
56. MPEP, supra note 47, at 2100.20.
57. 35 u.s.c. §§ 101-102.
58. The public domain is a term of art, meaning in general that which is available to the public, but with
important exceptions for things that were maintained in confidence. See infra Part Ili.F.
59. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
60. Id. § I 03.
61. In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
62. 35 u.s.c. §§ 112, 113.
63. !d. § 112.
64. !d. ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."). In addition, rules of the
patent office require that the claim be a single sentence and comply with other stylistic requirements that make
many patents seem impenetrable to the uninitiated. MPEP, supra note 47, at 608.0l(m).
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The invention is defined by one or more claims that form a part of the
patent application. 65 If any of the claims are determined to comply with the
66
statutory requirements, a patent may be issued covering those claims.
The
issued patent gives its owner the right to stop others from making, using,
selling, or offering to sell products incorporating the claims during the term of
the patent. 67
Before it may be issued as a patent, an application for a tax strategy
patent must be submitted to the USPTO, examined for compliance with the
formal requirements of the statute and regulations (e.g., proper form,
signatures, payment of fees), classified; 68 and then forwarded to an examiner in
the appropriate Examining Group 69 who will review the application for
compliance with the substantive provisions of the patent statute. The
examiner's review is governed by the USPTO's internal policy manual, the
MPEP. 70 The application must clear one practical and six statutory hurdles in
order to be issued as a patent, and an additional hurdle in order to be held valid
if challenged. 71
B. Hurdle ]-Delay Between Filing and Grant ofa Patent

The first hurdle facing any patent applicant is the delay involved in
obtaining a patent. Although the patent office has announced a long-term
strategic goal of disposing of applications within eighteen months of filing, 72
its "target" for the fiscal year 2006 was 31.3 months and the actual average
pendency for the fiscal year 2005 was 31.1 months. 73 This hurdle is
65. 35 U.S.C. § 112. In patent law, there is an important distinction between the portion of an
application that describes the prior art and the asserted advance and the portion of the application that
describes what the applicant claims. MPEP, supra note 47, at 608.01(c)-(d). Both sections together are
referred to as the "specification." !d. at 608.01(a). The specification must teach how to make and use the
invention and is usually used to argue why the claimed invention may be distinguished from the prior art; the
claims must define "the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." !d. at 608.0l(k) The only
portion that may be infringed is the claim. Although a patent application may provide background information
and may describe the theory of operation of the claimed invention, the only constraint on competition is
infringement of the claims. See infra Part IV.
66. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 151.
67. !d. § 271. Remedies for infringement of a patent may include: injunctions, damages, and attorney
fees. !d. §§ 283, 284, 285.
68. A tax strategy most likely would be placed in Class 705, subclass 36T. Class 705 covers "Data
processing: Financial, Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price Determination." U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE,
U.S.
PATENT
CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM-CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/def/705.htrn (last visited June 22, 2008).
'
69. MPEP, supra note 47, at 500.24. The Patent Office examining corps is organized by technology and
staffed by examiners with expertise in the field. A tax strategy patent would most likely be assigned to Group
2760. The Patent Office is aware that emerging fields pose a special challenge and require special efforts to
recruit and train examiners. See supra Part II.B.
70. MPEP, supra note 47, foreword.
71. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102, 112. This is not a complete catalog of requirements for patentability, but only
those that would pose special problems for tax strategy patents.
72. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 10 {2003), available at
http://www l.uspto.gov/go/cornlstrat21/stratplan_03 feb2003 .pdf.
73. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR
2006: FINANCIAL AND PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS,
http://wwwl.uspto.gov/go/com/annualf2006/
IOO_summary.htrnl (last visited June 22, 2008). At midyear 2007, the average pendency for business method
patents in Class 705 was fifty-four months; on average, applicants did not even receive a first substantive
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particularly significant in areas of rapid obsolescence. Though the risk of
obsolescence arises more typically where new technology displaces more
expensive older technology or offers new features, tax strategy patents are
vulnerable to the risk of obsolescence as well, because Congress or the IRS can
destroy the value of a tax strategy by changing the statute or regulations at any
time. 7
Moreover, tax strategy patents are likely to disclose precisely what the
IRS or Congress may view as loo-Hholes in need of closing and therefore
expedite their own obsolescence. 5 Thus, the threshold question for a
prospective tax strategy applicant is whether there will be any value to having
a patent three or four years in the future. 76
C. Hurdle 2-Utility

In order to be patentable, an invention must be useful. 77 The threshold
for utility is not high, 78 but if the invention cannot work, it will fail the utility
requirement. 79 The Federal Circuit has held, in an en bane decision, that the
Constitution limits patentability to the "purpose of advancing the useful artsthe process today called technological innovation." 80 There is case law
suggesting that inventions that depend on man-made law (as opposed to natural
laws) are not statutory subject matter and therefore not patentable. 81 Even if
the prohibition of "law-based" patents is not absolute, the utility of a tax
strategy may disappear if the law changes 82 or if the IRS classifies it as
abusive.
To some degree, the problem may be solved by creative claim-drafting.
For example, a claim to a "process for reducing taxes" would face different
challenges than a claim to a "process for structuring a transaction" or a
"process for reporting a transaction." The Internal Revenue Code imposes
response for forty-four months from the date of filing. CoGGINS, supra note 25.
74. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offiet Requirement in the Tax
Legislative Process, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501, 537-38 (1998) (discussing the legislative dynamics of tax
loopholes).
75. !d.
76. There is a procedure for Accelerated Examination, which requires that the applicant conduct a
patentability search, limit the number of claims, and file electronically. MPEP, supra note 47, at 708.02.
Applications filed under this procedure receive special treatment with a goal of disposition within one year.
Notice: Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications to Make Special and for Accelerated
Examination, 71 Fed. Reg. 36323-24 (June 26, 2006). The program, introduced on August 25, 2006, is too new
to determine whether the USPTO will meet its target. !d.
77. 35 U.S.C. § I 01 (2000).
78. See Steinfur Patents Corp. v. William Beyer, Inc., 62 F.2d 238, 240 (2d. Cir. 1932) (holding a
product resulting from the practice of a process of treating new skins sufficiently new and useful).
79. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[W]hen a claim requires ...
accomplishing an unattainable result ... the claim must be held invalid under either§ 101 or§ 112 .... ").
80. Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en bane).
81. See irifra Part III.D. In the view of the USPTO, legal agreements are not patentable. See U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS FOR
PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY (2005), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2005/week47/
patgupa.htrn.
82. One possible justification for distinguishing between natural law and manmade law is that the
former does not change.
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penalties on the underpayment of taxes unless there is "substantial authority"
for the taxpayer's position 83 or the relevant facts "are adequately disclosed in
the return and there is a reasonable basis for the tax treatment of such item by
the taxpayer." 84 In the first case, a claimed process for reducing taxes, the
patent would become invalid for lack of utility if Congress changed the statute
or the IRS successfully challenged the strategy; 85 the other types of claims
might remain useful in light of such events.
D. Hurdle 3-Statutory Subject Matter
In order to be patentable, an invention must fit one of the four cateiories
6
enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 101, so-called "statutory subject matter."
In
addition, certain types of inventions that fall within the literal terms of one of
the statutory categories are not patentable under judicially announced
exceptions. Under current Supreme Court case law "[p]henomena of nature,
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are
not patentable as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological
work." 87 The dividing line is that "[w]hile a scientific truth, or the
mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful
structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be." 88
The Patent Office initially interpreted Supreme Court guidance as
compelling it to reject claims to inventions using mathematical algorithms as
unpatentable per se. 89 In In re Alappat, the inventor had solved the problem
of the jagged appearance of waveforms on oscilloscopes by varying the
intensity of pixels making up the waveform display according to a formula
based on the distance of the pixel from the actual waveform. 90 The examiner
rejected claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 "because the claim was
directed to nonstatutory subject matter." 91 The Board of Patent Appeals
reversed, holding that, although the claims included a mathematical algorithm,
"the claim as a whole [was] directed to a machine and thus to statutory subject
83. 26 u.s.c. § 6662(d)(l) (2000).
84. /d. § 6662(d)(2).
85. It might be argued that invalidating the patent would impose no further injury on the patent holder
once the strategy had been successfully challenged by the IRS and therefore rendered valueless. Whether a
successful IRS challenge would render the patent valueless would depend on the terms of any licensing
agreement the patentee had entered. Further, the mere existence of the patent might place licensees at greater
risk. See infra Part III.H.
86. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent ....").
87. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). Laws of nature "are part of the storehouse of
knowledge ... free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
333 u.s. 127, 130 (1948).
88. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of
Am., 306 U.S. 86,94 (1939)); see also Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S 252,268 (1854) ("It is for the discovery or
invention of some practicable method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is
granted ....").
89. John T. Soma et al., Software Patents: A U.S. and E.U Comparison, 8 U. BALT.lNTELL. PROP. L.J.
l' 15 (2000).
90. 33 F.3d 1526, 1527 (Fed. Cir 1994).
91. /d.atl540.
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92

matter .... " In an unusual move, an expanded Board reconsidered the case
and affirmed the Examiner's rejection, ruling "when the claim is viewed
without the steps of this mathematical algorithm, no other elements or steps are
93
found" and therefore was not directed to statutory subject matter for two
reasons: it did not describe a machine, 94 and it fell within a judicially-created
exception that precluded patenting "mathematical algorithms." The Federal
Circuit reversed, holding that although the claim included a formula, the
overall claimed invention was a machine. 95
[T]he Supreme Court never intended to create an overly broad, fourth
category of subject matter excluded from§ 101. Rather, at the core of
the Court's analysis ... lies an attempt by the Court to explain a rather
straightforward concept, namely, that certain types of mathematical
subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract
ideas until reduced to some type of practical application, and thus that
subject matter is not, in and of itself, entitled to patent
protection.... [T]he proper inquiry in dealing with the so called [sic]
mathematical subject matter exception to § 101 alleged herein is to see
whether the claimed subject matter as a whole is a disembodied
mathematical concept, whether categorized as a mathematical
formula, mathematical equation, mathematical algorithm, or the like,
which in essence represents nothing more than a "law of nature,"
"natural phenomenon," or "abstract idea." 96
If so, the patenting of that subject matter is precluded. That is not the case
here.
[T]he claimed invention as a whole is directed to a combination of
interrelated elements which combine to form a machine for converting
discrete waveform data samples into anti-aliased pixel illumination
intensity data to be displayed on a display means. This is not a
disembodied mathematical concept ... but rather a specific machine
to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result. 97
Whether claims constitute statutory subject matter is a question of law
and is reviewed without deference. 98 However, as noted by Judge Newman,
concurring in In re Alappat, "[t]he boundary between patentable and
unpatentable subject matter is not always a bright line." 99
In In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit recognized a certain confusion in the
Supreme Court's guidance:
The Supreme Court has not been clear ... as to whether such subject
matter is excluded from the scope of § 101 because it represents laws
92. Id. at 1539.
93. /d. at 1539-40.
94. The claim also did not fit within one of the other three statutory categories: it was not suggested that
it might be a composition of matter or manufacture, and was not drafted as a process.
95. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
96. /d. at 1543-44 (citations omitted).
97. !d. at 1544 (citations omitted).
98. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
99. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1529 (Newman, J. concurring).
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of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas. The Supreme Court
also has not been clear as to exactly what kind of mathematical subject
matter may not be patented. The Supreme Court has used, among
others, the terms "mathematical algorithm," "mathematical formula,"
and "mathematical equation" to describe types of mathematical
subject matter not entitled to patent protection standing alone. The
Supreme Court has not set forth, however, any consistent or clear
explanation of what it intended by such terms or how these terms are
related, if at all. 100
The Supreme Court itself noted that the "line between a 'patentable'
process and an unpatentable 'principle' is not always clear." 101 The USPTO
and Federal Circuit have announced, then abandoned, a series of shortcut tests
for dividing unpatentable subject matter from patentable subject matter,
including the "technolo~ical arts" test; 102 the "Freeman-Walter-Abele test"; 103
the "mental step" test; 04 the mathematical algorithm test; 105 the "machine
implemented" test; 106 and the "data transformation" test. 107
In State Street the Federal Circuit found that

100. !d. at 1543 n.19 (citations omitted).
10 I. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).
102. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970), abrogated by Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972).
103. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re
Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C. C.P.A. 1982), abrogated by AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1359 ("Whatever may be left of
the earlier [Freeman-Walter-Abele] test, if anything, this type of physical limitations analysis seems of little
value....").
104. Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893 ("We cannot agree with the board that these claims (all the steps of
which can be carried out by the disclosed apparatus) are directed to non-statutory processes merely because
some or all the steps therein can also be carried out in or with the aid of the human mind or because it may be
necessary for one performing the processes to think.").
I 05. In Gottschalk v. Benson, the Supreme Court held that a claim to a method of converting binarycoded decimal numbers into decimal numbers was not an "invention or discovery" under section 10 I, even
though the claimed method was to be performed by a computer because the method had "no substantial
practical application except in connection with a digital computer." Benson, 409 U.S. 63, at 71. In Flook, the
Supreme Court held that a claim to a method of updating "alarm limits" was not an "invention or discovery''
under section I 01 because the claimed invention amounted to the discovery of a mathematical formula that
was "not the kind of 'discovery' that the statute was enacted to protect," even though the calculation of the
alarm limit was a component of a catalytic conversion process for the petrochemical industry and the Court
assumed the formula was novel and useful. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593. In Diehr, the Supreme Court held that a
claim to a process for operating a rubber-molding press was within section I 01, even though one element of
the claim was the calculation, by a computer, of the appropriate time to open the press. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
184 (1981 ). It was known that the time that rubber should remain in the mold to cure properly depended on
temperature, and the claimed invention included a thermocouple for measuring temperature inside the press
and feeding signals to a computer that would calculate the correct cure time (using a previously known
formula) and open the press. !d. at 187. The Court distinguished Flook as not containing any "disclosure
relating to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process variables, or the means of setting off an
alarm system." !d. Diehr did not claim the "the isolated step of 'programming a digital computer."' !d. at 193
n.l5. "[E]xcluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas ....
Our recent holdings in Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v. Flook, both of which are computer-related, stand
for no more than these long-established principles." !d. at 185 (citations omitted).
I 06. The fact that a nonstatutory method is carried out on a programmed computer does not make the
process claim statutory. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 841 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
I 07. Merely transforming data from one value to another does not make a claim statutory. See Benson,
409 U.S. at 72 (holding method of converting binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers
unpatentable).
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the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a
machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final
share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical
algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces "a useful,
concrete and tangible result" a final share price momentarily fixed
for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied
upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades [and thus
satisfies the statutory subject matter requirement.] 108
AT&T v. Excel Communications 109 involved a patent issued for an
addition of a field in a telephone billing record. As explained by the circuit
court, when a caller makes a direct-dialed long-distance phone call, the system
generates a record including the originating and terminating phone numbers,
and the length of time of the call for billing. 110 The patent at issue added a
"primary interexchange carrier indicator" that allowed long-distance carriers to
provide differential billing treatment, depending upon whether the call was to a
phone with the same or a different long-distance carrier. 111 The district court
held that the claims "implicitly recite a mathematical algorithm, ... and thus
fall within the judiciallY: created 'mathematical algorithm' exception to
statutory subject matter." 1 2
The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that it had held in State Street that a
system that "takes data representing discrete dollar amounts through a series of
mathematical calculations to determine a final share price - a useful, concrete,
and tangible result" was patentable, 113 and that, in the pending case a value
was derived using a simple mathematical principle but that was
not determinative because AT&T does not claim the Boolean
principle ... AT&T is only claiming a process that uses the Boolean
principle in order to determine the value of the PIC indicator. The PIC
indicator represents information about the call recipient's PIC, a
useful, non-abstract result that facilitates differential billing of longdistance calls .... Because the claimed process applies the Boolean
principle to produce a useful, concrete, tangible result without preempting other uses of the mathematical principle, on its face the
claimed process comfortably falls within the scope of§ 101. 114
Although the Federal Circuit follows State Street, the validity of State
108. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
109. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
II 0. !d. at 1354.
Ill. !d. at 1353-54. Claim I provided:
A method for use in a telecommunications system in which interexchange calls initiated by each subscriber are
automatically routed over the facilities of a particular one of a plurality of interexchange carriers associated
with that subscriber, said method comprising the steps of: generating a message record for an interexchange
call between an originating subscriber and a terminating subscriber, and including, in said message record, a
primary interexchange carrier (PIC) indicator having a value which is a function of whether or not the
interexchange carrier associated with said terminating subscriber is a prede:ermined one of said interexchange
carriers.
!d. at 1354 (emphasis removed).
112. !d. at 1355-56.
113. Jd at 1358.
114. !d.
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Street, at least in its broadest construction, is not free from doubt.
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the Patent Office's
internal reviewing authority, continues to affirm examiner rejections of certain
business method claims, 115 and at least one administrative patent judge
considers "[t]he quest for a bright line test for determining whether a claimed
invention embodies statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 ... an
exercise in futility." 116 In Ex parte Bilski, an administrative appeal of the
rejection of claims to a method for hedging risk, 117 the applicant asserted that
''energy consumers face two kinds of risk: price risk and consumption risk"
and that "consumption risk (e.g., the need to use more or less energy than
planned due to the weather) is said to be not currently managed in energy
markets, which is the problem addressed by the invention," but admitted "that
118
the steps of the method need not be performed on a computer."
The
examiner rejected the claims as nonstatutory, finding that no specific apparatus
was disclosed and therefore, "'the claims are non-statutory, because they are
directed solely to an abstract idea and solve a purely mathematical problem
without practical application in the technological arts.' Therefore, the final
rejection relies on both the 'abstract idea' exclusion and a 'technological arts'
test for statutory subject matter." 119 The Board characterized the claims as
"'non-machine-implemented' method claims, i.e., the claims do not recite how
the steps are implemented and are broad enough to read on performing the
steps without any machine or apparatus." 120 In the Board's view, this took the
case beyond the holding of State Street and AT&T v. Excel, cases that the
Board viewed as involving the "special case" of transformation of data by a
121
machine.
Noting that "the bounds of patentable subject matter are increasingly

115. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479 (Feb. 28, 1996).
The USPTO draws the line as follows: Although abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature are not
eligible for patenting, methods and products employing abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature
to perform a real-world function may well be. ld.
116. Ex parte Bilski, Appeal No. 2002-2257, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, at *80 (B. Pat. App. &
Interferences 2006). (McQuade, J., concurring).
117. !d. at *1-2. Claim I provided:
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed
price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of said commodity
wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate
corresponding to a risk position of said consumer;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market participants at a
second fixed rate such that said series of market participant transactions balances the risk position of said
series of consumer transactions.
!d.
118. !d. at *2, 4.
119. !d. at *3-4 (citations omitted).
120. !d. at *6.
121. !d. at *6-7; see AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(regarding a "Call Message Recording for Telephone Systems patent," which aids long-distance carriers in
providing differential billing treatment for subscribers); see also State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin.
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (regarding data processing system for implementing an
investment structure)
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being tested" and that "[i]n recent years, the USPTO has been flooded with
claims to "processes,, many of which bear scant resemblance to classical
processes of manipulating or transforming compositions of matter or forms of
energy from one state to another [including] claims to methods of meditation,
dating, physical sports moves, etc .... " 122 The Board affirmed the rejections.
The Supreme Court declined a recent opportunity to resolve the issue,
although a dissenting opinion indicates that the scope of patentability of
business methods is not completely settled. In Laboratory Corporation of
America v. Metabolite Labs, the applicant claimed a process for diagnosing
vitamin deficiency, 123 which consisted of testing a blood sample for elevated
levels of homocysteine and then "noticing whether its level is elevated above
the norm." 124 The patent office allowed the claim and a district court upheld a
jury verdict that the patent was valid and infringed. 125 The Federal Circuit
affirmed. 126 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
patent claim is invalid on the ground that it improperly seeks to '"claim a
monopoly over a basic scientific relationship,' namely, the relationship
between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency." 127 The Court dismissed the
writ as improvidently granted, with three justices dissenting. 128
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the writ should not have been
dismissed because of the importance of resolving the patentability of such
processes and because
this case is not at the boundary. It does not require [the Supreme
Court] to consider the precise scope of the ·natural phenomenon'
doctrine or any other difficult issue. In [Justice Breyer's] view, claim
13 is invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets that
doctrine. There can be little doubt that the correlation between
homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a 'natural
phenomenon.' 129
The dissent explains the philosophy behind exclusion of laws of nature
from patentable subject matter:
The relevant principle of law "[e]xclude[s] from. . . patent
protection ... laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.

122. Ex parte Bilski, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS, at *7-8.
123. 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2922 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). A representative claim provided: "A method
for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: assaying a
body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine
in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate." Id. at 2924. The inventors testified that the
correlating step consisted simply of recognizing that an elevated homocysteine level-by that very factshows the patient likely has a vitamin deficiency and that, ''because the natural relationship between
homocysteine and vitamin deficiency was now well known, such 'correlating' would occur automatically in
the mind of any competent physician." !d.
124. !d. at 2921.
125. /d.
126. !d. at 2925.
127. Id.
128. !d. at 2922.
129. !d. at 2927.
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The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that "laws
of nature" are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are
not useful. To the contrary, research into such matters may be costly
and time-consuming; monetary incentives may matter; and the fruits
of those incentives and that research may prove of great benefit to the
human race. Rather, the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too
much patent protection can impede rather than "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts," the constitutional objective of patent and
copyright protection.
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage
research by providing monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes
their presence can discourage research by impeding the free exchange
of information.
Thus, the Court has recognized that "[p ]henomena of nature, though
just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts
are ... the basic tools of scientific and technological work." It has
treated fundamental scientific principles as "part of the storehouse of
knowledge" and manifestations of laws of nature as "free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none." And its doing so reflects a basic
judgment that protection in such cases, despite its potentially positive
incentive effects, would too often severely interfere with, or
discourage, development and the further spread of useful knowledge
itself." 1311
Of particular importance, the dissent questions the validity of State Street:
That case does say that a process is patentable if it produces a "useful,
concrete, and tangible result." But this Court has never made such a
statement and, if taken literally, the statement would cover instances
where this Court has held the contrary. The Court, for example, has
invalidated a claim to the use of electromagnetic current for
transmitting messages over long distances even though it produces a
result that seems "useful, concrete, and tangible." Similarly the Court
has invalidated a patent setting forth a system for triggering alarm
limits in connection with catalytic conversion despite a similar utility,
concreteness, and tangibility. And the Court has invalidated a patent
setting forth a process that transforms, for computer-programming
purposes, decimal figures into binary figures-even though the result
would seem useful, concrete, and at least arguably (within the
computer's wiring system) tangible. 131

130.
131.

/d. at 2922-23 (citations omitted).
/d. at 2928 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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1. Patentability ofBusiness Methods

In one sense, there is a special category of inventions known as "business
method patents." 132 However, for purposes of determining patentability, and
133
the USPTO's examination of applications, there is no such category.
"Office personnel have had difficulty in properly treating claims directed to
methods of doing business. Claims should not be categorized as methods of
doing business. Instead such claims should be treated like any other process
claims . . . ." 134
Doubt as to the patentability of business methods was alleviated by the
Federal Circuit in State Street. The patent office issued a patent to Signature
on "Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial Services
Configuration." 135
In essence, the system ... facilitates a structure whereby mutual funds
(Spokes) pool their assets in an investment portfolio (Hub) organized
as a partnership. This investment configuration provides the
administrator of a mutual fund with the advantageous combination of
economies of scale in administering investments coupled with the tax
advantages of a partnership. 136
Unable to license the patented invention, State Street sought a declaratory
judgment that the patent was invalid. 137 The district court granted summary
judgment that the patent was invalid as not meeting the statutory subject matter
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101. 138 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that
the patent was directed to statutory subject matter, a machine. 139
Citing the 1980 Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the
court held that the "repetitive use of the expansive term 'any' in § 101 shows
Congress's intent not to place any restrictions on the subject matter for which a
patent may be obtained beyond those specifically recited in § 101." 140 The
Federal Circuit went on to note three categories of subject matter that the
Supreme Court had held unpatentable: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas. 141
132. The patent statute provides exemptions from what would otherwise be infiingement in the case of
business method patents. See infra Part IV.
133. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (enumerating the four categories of patentable inventions: machines,
manufactures, compositions of matter and processes.); MPEP, supra note 47, at 706.03(a) (describing
guidelines for subject matter rejections).
134. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTER-RELATED
INVENTIONS I (1996).
135. U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (filed Mar. I I, 1991).
136. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
137. !d.
138. !d.
139. The Federal Circuit held that sufficient structure was recited in the application to constitute a
machine, but went on to evaluate the district court's holding that the claims fell under a judicial exception to
statutory subject matter, either the "mathematical algorithm" exception or the "business method" exception.
!d. at 1371.
140. !d. at 1373 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,308-09 (1980)). The court also noted that
"[t]he Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject
matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man."' !d. at 1374 n.3.
141. !d. at 1373 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, at 185 (1981)).
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The Federal Circuit then explained the difference between unpatentable
mathematical algorithms and patentable machines or methods:
Unpatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by showing
they are merely abstract ideas constituting disembodied concepts or
truths that are not "useful." From a practical standpoint, this means
that to be patentable an algorithm must be applied in a "useful" way.
In Alappat, we held that data, transformed by a machine through a
series of mathematical calculations to produce a smooth waveform
display on a rasterizer monitor, constituted a practical application of
an abstract idea (a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation),
because it produced "a useful, concrete and tangible result"-the
smooth waveform.
Similarly, in Arrhythmia Research Technology Inc. v. Corazonix
Corp., . . . we held that the transformation of electrocardiograph
signals from a patient's heartbeat by a machine through a series of
mathematical calculations constituted a practical application of an
abstract idea (a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation),
because it corresponded to a useful, concrete or tangible thing-the
condition of a patient's heart. 142
The court applied this rule by holding that
the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a
machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final
share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical
algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces "a useful,
concrete and tangible result"-a final share price momentarily fixed
for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied
upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades. 143
The court rejected the argument that there was a ).udicially-created
"business method" exception to patentable subject matter. 1 4 "We take this
opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest ... The business method
exception has never been invoked by this court . . . to deem an invention
unpatentable." 145
2. Are Tax Strategies Business Methods?

Under current USPTO guidelines, a claim to a specific business process
would meet the requirements of statutory subject matter, as it would be one of
the categories of inventions covered by the patent statute. 146 It is an open
question whether such a process would qualify as statutory subject matter
under Supreme Court precedent-the Court has not addressed the issue, and

142.

143.
144.
145.
146.

!d.
!d.
!d. at 1377.
!d. at 1375
MPEP, supra note 47, at 2106.
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the Breyer dissent language suggests that at least some justices have
.
147
questwns.
There is, however, a possible distinguishing characteristic of tax strategy
patents: they depend on legislation. One possible consequence of this
distinction is that even if the strategy satisfies the statutory subject matter
requirement of§ 10 I, it may fail the utility requirement. 148 Moreover, there is
authority at the Federal Circuit level suggesting that legal agreements fail the
.
.
I®
statutory sub~ect matter reqmrement.
In re Comiskey involved a method for mandatory arbitration involving
legal documents, such as wills or contracts. 150 The examiner rejected the
application as obvious. 151 The Federal Circuit stated that "we do not reach the
ground relied on by the Board below-that the claims were unpatentable as
obvious ... because we conclude that many of the claims are 'barred at the
threshold by § 101. '" 152 Reaffirming the decision in State Street that
patentability does "not tum on whether the claimed subject matter does
'business' instead of something else," 153 the court also noted that State Street
"explicitly held that business methods are 'subject to the same le,ral
requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method."' 15
The court held that, Comiskey having conceded that the claims at issue
did not require a machine, the claims were to the mental process of resolving a
legal dispute between two ~arties by the decision of a human arbitrator and not
patentable subject matter. 1 5 Thus, an applicant for a tax strategy patent would
face uncertainty as to whether the category itself is, in fact, patentable.
E. Hurdle 4-Novelty
Since the first patent statute, patents have been available to novel
inventions only, a requirement reflected in sections 101 and 102 of the current
statute. 156 Patents are intended to provide an incentive to add to the public
domain. 157 Therefore, a patent cannot be granted on something which is
147. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 134-39 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (discussing whether specific business processes are or should be covered by the patent statute).
148. See supra Part III.C (discussing the utility requirement).
149. See supra Part III.D (discussing the statutory subject matter requirement).
150. 499 FJd 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
151. /d. at 1368.
152. /d. at 1371.
153. /d. at 1374.
154. !d.
155. /d. at 1379. The court did, however, consider other claims separately. "They recite the use of
'modules,' including 'a registration module for enrolling' a person, 'an arbitration module for incorporating
arbitration language,' and 'an arbitration resolution module for requiring a complainant [or party] to submit a
request for arbitration resolution to the mandatory arbitration system."' !d. "When an un-patentable mental
process is combined with a machine, the combination may produce patentable subject matter, as the Supreme
Court's decision in Diehr and our own decisions in State Street and AT&T have confirmed." !d. The court
therefore remanded those claims to determine if they met the remaining requirements for patentability. !d. at
1381.
156. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (2000) (explaining who may obtain a patent and the conditions for
patentability).
157. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS §1:24 (2d ed. 2008).
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. the pnor
. art. 158
a1ready m
The prior art consists of information 159 that was available to the public
prior to the applicant's date of invention 160 and information that was available
161
The
to the public more than a year prior to the applicant's priority date.
information may have become public through a patent application, through a
publication in a journal, through presentation at a conference, or through use of
the claimed invention, among other routes.
In addition, patent policy discourages use of the claimed invention by the
inventor for any significant period before filing an application. In Metallizing
162
the Second
Engineering Co., Inc. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., Inc.,
Circuit traced the early history and policy behind the public use bar:
So far as we can find, the first case which dealt with the effect of prior
use by the patentee was Pennock v. Dialogue, in which the invention
had been completed in 1811, and the patent granted in 1818 for a
process of making hose by which the sections were joined together in
such a way that the joints resisted pressure as well as the other parts.
It did not appear that the joints in any way disclosed the process; but
the patentee, between the discovery of the invention and the grant of
the patent, had sold 13,000 feet of hose; and as to this the judge
charged: "If the public, with the knowledge and tacit consent of the
inventor, be permitted to use the invention, without opposition, it is a
fraud on the public afterwards to take out a patent." The Supreme
Court affirmed a judgment for the defendant, on the ground that the
invention had been "known or used before the application." "If an
inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the
public the secrets of his invention; if he should ... make and sell his
invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits, . . . it would
materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts" to allow
him fourteen years of legal monopoly "when the danger of
competition should force him to secure the exclusive right". In Shaw
v. Cooper the public use was not by the inventor, but he had neglected
to prevent it after he had learned of it, and this defeated the patent.
"Whatever may be the intentiqn of the inventor, if he suffers his
invention to go into public use, through any means whatsoever,
without an immediate assertion of his right, he is not entitled to a
patent". 163
"Public use" of a claimed invention under section 102(b) has been

158. 35 u.s.c. § 102.
159. There are two categories of information that form the patent public domain: printed publications and
patents anywhere in the world qualifY, but other acts must occur in the United States in order to qualifY. Id. §
102(a)-(b).
160. /d.§ 102.
161. The priority date is usually the date of the first application filed by the applicant that describes the
claimed invention, provided certain technical requirements are met. University of Cincinnati, Intellectual
Property Office, Patent FAQs, http://www.ipo.uc.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=overview.faq (last visited Apr. 9
2008).
'
162. 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946).
163. !d. at 518 (citations omitted).
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defined as any use of that invention by a person other than the inventor who is
164
Tax
under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the inventor.
165
However, the duty to maintain the
returns are confidential by law.
166
Thus,
confidentiality of the return runs to the taxpayer, not the tax adviser.
filing a tax return that discloses the tax strategy sought to be patented would
167
create prior art available to defeat a subsequent patent application.
There is an exception for experimental use of an invention by or under
control of the inventor in order to perfect the invention, 168 but that exception is
unlikely to apply to tax strategy patents. 169
F. Hurdle 5-Non-Obviousness
In one sense, the novelty of tax strategy patents may be the easiest hurdle
to clear. Every time the tax law changes, there are new opportunities to do
things that have never been done before in exactly the same way. The more
difficult hurdle is obviousness. The standard is set by 35 U.S.C. § 103. 170
Things that would be obvious to others of ordinary skill in the relevant field
are not patentable. As explained in Graham v. John Deere: 171

Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue
are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
resolved. Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness
of the subject matter is determined. 172
In KSR International v. Teleflex, the Supreme Court reviewed a holding
that claims were patentable under a bright-line test developed by the Federal
Circuit. 173 The patent office had issued the patent, but at trial the district court
found little difference between the prior art and the claimed invention, and
therefore invalidated the patent as obvious. 174 The Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that the District Court failed to make "'findings as to the specific
164. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333,336 (1881).
165. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2000).
166. See Alpert v. Riley, No. H-04-CV-3774, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22950 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (finding
attorney not liable for disclosing tax information under§ 6103 because they are not government employees).
167. An interesting issue would be posed by the question whether the IRS' knowledge would be enough.
to satisfy the public use trigger. The issue could be avoided by filing the patent application before filing the
first return using the claimed invention.
168. See Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 128, 135 (1877) ("[S)uch use is not a public use ... so long
as the inventor engaged, in good faith, in testing its operation.").
169. It is difficult to identify an area of experimentation that is needed to perfect a tax strategy invention.
170. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) ("A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section l 02 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains.").
171. 383 U.S. I (1966).
172. /d.atl7.
173. See KSR Int'l v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007) (stating that under the "teaching,
suggestion, or motivation" (TSM) test, a patent claim is deemed obvious only "if 'some motivation or
suggestion to combine the prior art teachings' can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the
knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art.").
174. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l, 298 F. Supp. 2d 581,596 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
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understanding or principle within the knowledge of a skilled artisan that would
have motivated one with no knowledge of [the] invention"' to combine the
references. 175 The Supreme Court, agreeing with the trial court, reversed
again. 176 "Throughout this Court's engagement with the question of
obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach
177
inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here."
The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic
conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by
overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit
content of issued patents. . . . Granting patent protection to advances
that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards
progress and may, in the case of patents combining previously known
elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility. 178
The obviousness of a tax strategy patent would be measured from the
perspective of a tax practitioner-either a CPA or a tax lawyer-given the
normal training of such a person and the normal knowledge of the relevant
law, resources and techniques used in the field of tax planning. 179 Under In re
Winslow, 180 this hypothetical practitioner would be presumed to know all of
the relevant prior art, which would (at a minimum) include legislative history
and IRS regulations and positions. 181
Thus, strategies that did nothing more than implement statutory
objectives could not pass the obviousness hurdle. 182 Implementing a strategy
using a computer program might help with the issue of statutory subject matter
but could hardly be considered a non-obvious step in the field of tax
. 183
p1anmng.
G. Hurdle 6-Written Description and Best Mode
The patent statute requires that an applicant describe how to make and use
the invention, and also disclose what the applicant believes to be the best mode
for carrying out the invention, referred to as the "enablement" and "best mode"
175. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l, No. 04-1152, 2005 WL 23377, at *5 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2005).
176. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
177. !d. at 1739.
178. Id. at 1741.
179. See 35 U.S.C. § I 03 (2000).
180. In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
181. See id. at 1578 ("S]ection 103 requires us to presume full knowledge by the inventor of the prior art
in the field of his endeavor.").
182. Earlier Federal Circuit cases that required publications to provide a teaching, suggestion or
motivation to combine pre-existing references to arrive at the claimed invention were severely criticized in
KSR lnt'l Co. v. Teleflex. KSR Int 'I Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1743. Under the KSR test, showing that a tax strategy
would be obvious to a tax practitioner given the legislative history, or even showing that the strategy would be
consistent with congressional intent would be sufficient to render a tax strategy patent obvious. See id. at 1740
("[W]hen a patent 'simply arranges old elements' ... and yields no more than one would expect from such
arrangement, the combination is obvious.").
183. See Leapfrog Enter., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
("Accommodating a prior art ... device ... to modem electronics would have been reasonably obvious"
because "[a]pplying modem electronics to older ... devices has been commonplace in recent years."); In re
Venner, 262 F.2d 91,95 (C. C.P.A. 1958) (automating previously known steps is not patentable).
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requirements, respectively. 184 The enablement requirement is designed to
assure that, in return for the limited term monopoly that a patent confers, the
public gets access to sufficient information to practice the invention once the
term has expired. 185 The best mode requirement is designed to prevent an
applicant from disclosirlg a theoretically feasible way of implementing the
invention while concealing preferable ways of doing so. 186 In other words,
"best mode" would require a tax strategy applicant to describe how they would
advise clients to use the strategy. 187
When the patent is issued the entire application and any correspondence
are made public. 188 This ordinarily poses little problem for patent owners
since competitors are unable to use the patented invention during the term of
the patent. 189 However, tax strategy patents are a special case. There is one
party that might destroy the value of the patent without using the invention: the
IRS. Once the strategy is disclosed in sufficient detail to enable one of
ordinary skill in the art to practice it (as required by § 112), the IRS will be
alerted to the potential lost revenue. Unlike competitors (other tax planners
and taxpayers), the IRS can respond to this loss of revenue without making,
using, or selling the strategy covered by the patent; by rulirlg that the strategy
is abusive or successfully lobbyirlg for a change in the statute, the IRS would
destroy the value of the patent without infringirlg. 190
As demonstrated above, a strategy that merely carries out Congressional
intent will be unpatentable as lacking novelty or being obvious. 191 Therefore,
presumably the patent at issue will be directed toward a result which, at best, is
not consistent with that intent. Since the application must disclose not only
how to implement the strategy but also what the applicant considers the best
way to carry it out, it will paint a clear target for the IRS. The IRS does not
need to infringe the patent to destroy its value-it can adopt regulations
making use of the strategy unacceptably risky or it can lobby Congress to

184. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("The specification shall contain a written description of the invention ... and shall
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.").
185. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
186. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C. C.P.A. 1962).
187. This would place a practitioner in a difficult position if she were to advise a client to follow a course
not set out in the application, which could lead to patent invalidity and malpractice.
188. The patent statute provides for publication of applications eighteen months after the application is
filed, which is generally prior to the patent's being granted. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(l). An applicant can
affirmatively opt out of pre-grant publication by agreeing not to file patent applications in any other country
that requires pre-grant publication. !d. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i). Presumably, most tax strategy patents' value would
be fully realized within the jurisdiction of the United States and there would be little additional value to
foreign patent applications. In this case, a well-advised tax strategist would file only in the United States and
would request that the application not be published before the patent is granted. This would defer alerting
competitors who might otherwise make use of the strategy before the patent is issued (see infi·a Part V) and the
IRS, which might otherwise move to defeat the strategy as soon as possible (quite possibly before the patent
even issued). See supra Part Ill. B.
189. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (containing the statutory definition of patent infringement).
190. Infringement is limited to making, using, or selling the patented invention. !d. It may be objected
that the IRS or Congress might choose not to spend the time to render the patented tax strategy worthless.
That objection, however, goes more to the question whether the problem is even serious enough to require
legislative action than to whether the solution should be the amendment of the patent statute.
I 91. See supra Parts ill.F, Ill. G.
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192

amend the tax statute to make the strategy unworkable.
Of perhaps greater practical importance, the patent application must
identify the inventor and, if the patent has been transferred (for example, to the
193
This
practitioner's firm), the transfer must be recorded to be effective.
could place the practitioner's clients at greater risk of audit or greater scrutiny
simply by virtue of association with the assignee of a tax strategy patent. As
the statute of limitations for examining tax returns is seven years, even clients
who made use of the strategy before the patent was issued would be at risk.
H. Hurdle 7-Fatal Delay

One of the objectives of the patent system is to provide incentives to
194
The statute provides such
place technology in the public domain promptly.
incentives in sections 102(b) and 103, which provide, in effect, a statute of
limitations of one year, running from the time that someone (the applicant
included) has made the invention public. 195 In addition, the patent statute
denies patentability to a~plicants who have abandoned, suppressed or
concealed their inventions. 1
The courts have consistently held that an invention, though completed,
is deemed abandoned, suppressed, or concealed if, within a reasonable
time after completion, no steps are taken to make the invention
publicly known. Thus, failure to file a patent application; to describe
the invention in a publicly disseminated document; or to use the
invention publicly, have been held to constitute abandonment,
. or concea1ment. 197
suppresston
In other words, the creator of a tax strategy patent runs a risk by using the
198
strategy in practice for a significant period before filing a patent application.
Some tax practitioners attempt to control access to their planning techniques by
requiring clients to sign confidentiality agreements. 199 Though the length of
time required to establish the bar is a question of fact, based on the nature and
192. As discussed at Part m.c supra, this would also render the patent invalid.
193. 35 U.S.C. § 261 ("An assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and
Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or
mortgage.").
194. See, e.g., id. § 200 (disclosing the various objectives of the patent system with respect to federally
funded research).
195. !d. §§ 102, 103.
196. !d. § I 02. Section I 02 provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or (c) he has abandoned the
invention, or ... (g) ... (2) before such person's invention thereof, the invention was made in this
country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining
priority of invention under this subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates of
conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was
first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
!d.
197. Int'l Glass Co. v. U.S., 408 F.2d 395,403 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (citations omitted).
198. !d.
199. See, e.g., 67 Fed. Reg. 64,799 (Oct. 22, 2002) (discussing confidential transactions).
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extent of activity from reduction to practice to filing the patent application,
attempting to profit from an invention in this fashion is a classic invitation to a
rejection based on suppression or concealment.
There is an "experimental use" exception, designed to permit limited
public use or sale if necessary in order to perfect the invention, 201 but it is
difficult to see how the exemption could apply to tax strategy patents. 202 To
successfully establish entitlement to this exception, the applicant would need to
demonstrate that experimentation was necessary to perfect the invention, and
that the experimentation required public use or sale. 203 Such an argument
would appear inconsistent with the IRS regulations requiring a good faith
belief in the correctness of the position being taken. 204
I. Hurdle 8-Post Issue Challenges

All of the above hurdles relate to the difficulty of getting a patent issued
quickly enough to be of any value. They are not meant to be an exhaustive
review of the process of obtaining a patent, but rather a catalog of special
issues that would be faced with respect to tax strategy patents. For
completeness, one more category of hurdles should be mentioned.
Once issued, a patent is presumed valid. 205 That presumption is
rebuttable, and there are several avenues for challenging an issued patent. 206 If
any party succeeds in invalidating an issued patent through any of these
avenues, the patent is invalid as to all parties. 207
1. Reexamination

The patent statute allows any party to request that the patent office
reconsider its decision to issue a patent, by filing a request for

200. See Dewey v. Lawton, 347 F.2d 629,632 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (holding that "testing and refinement" for
more than a year did not constitute concealment); Frey v. Wagner, 87 F.2d 212, 215 (C.C.P.A. 1937) ("The
law does not punish an inventor for attempting to perfect his process before he gives it to the public.").
Although abandonment, suppression, or concealment does not arise solely by delay, delay provides a basis for
an inference of intent to abandon, suppress, or conceal. See Shindelar v. Holdeman, 628 F.2d 1337 (C. C.P.A.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981) (stating that a two year and five months delay is also unreasonably
long); Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (stating that • four year delay is prima facie
unreasonably long)
201. City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson, 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877).
202. It would take an exceptionally brave practitioner to argue that experimentation was necessary to
perfect the strategy by filing returns to see if the IRS would challenge them.
203. See, e.g., Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(discussing the requirements of experimental use).
204. In addition, the validity of a reporting position could be "experimentally" tested by requesting an
IRS Letter Ruling. See IRS Bulletin 2007-l, at 118, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb07-0I.pdf
It would be difficult to qualify for the experimental use exception.
205. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
206. There are also avenues for resisting the grant of a pending patent application. The assumption has
been made, however, that careful practitioners will avoid pre-grant publication. Therefore, opportunities for
pending application challenges will be extremely limited.
207. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330-51 (1971) (stating that a
holding of patent invalidity by one court may be asserted by an infringement defendant in another case).
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reexamination. 208 The process is more abbreviated than the initial examination
209
process, and the types of materials that may be considered are limited
2. Declaratory Judgment ofInvalidity

Any party meeting constitutional standing requirements may challenge an
210
issued patent through a declaratory judgment action.
3. Infringement Defense

One of the defenses available to a defendant in an infringement action is
the invalidity of the patent. 211 Thus, although an issued patent, as a decision of
an ex~ert administrative agency within the area of its expertise, is presumed
valid, 12 the presumption is rebuttable. Any of the hurdles overcome in
obtaining a patent are open for reconsideration in defense of an infringement
action.
IV. THE RIGHTS OF A TAX STRATEGY PATENT OWNER

Once an application is allowed and issues as a patent, its owner has the
right to stop competitors from making, using, selling, or importing the patented
invention for a period of twenty years from the date the patent application was
filed. 213 With respect to a tax strategy patent, this would translate into two
significant rights: rights against other tax advisers who use the invention to
advise clients; and rights against taxpayers who use the invention to structure
transactions or file tax returns. Thus, potential defendants include the actual
taxpayer, lawyers, and accountants.
The rights include the right to recover damages, which by statute, are to
be no less than a reasonable royalty, 214 and which in practice rarely exceed that
measure. 215 Injunctions are also available, 216 although not automatic. 217 In
208. 35 U.S.C. § 301 ("Any person at any time may cite to the Office in writing prior art consisting of
patents . . . which that person believes to have bearing on the patentability of any claim of a particular
patent."). The term "third-party requester" means a person requesting ex parte reexamination under section
302 or inter partes reexamination under section 311 who is not the patent owner. Id. §§ 302, 311.
209. Only printed documents may be submitted. !d. §§ 301, 302.
210. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2000) (stating that declaratory judgments may be used in case of an
actual case or controversy); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502 (D.
Mass. 1996).
211. 35 u.s.c. § 282.
212. !d.
213. The term of a U.S. patent is currently twenty years from the date the earliest application is filed (i.e.,
ifthere are a series of related patent applications, referred to as "continuing applications," the term is measured
from the first one filed), and is subject to adjustment in certain circumstances related to delays in processing by
the USPTO. !d. § 154.
214. !d. § 284.
215. See Third Wave Tech., Inc. v. Stratagene Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1101 (W.O. Wis. 2005)
(noting fact that in setting damages according to § 284, courts "imagine a negotiation between the patentee and
infringer taking place at the moment the infringement began" which "is an approach that experts have
employed for decades in patent cases.").
216. 35 U.S.C. § 283 ("[C]ourts may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.").
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addition, in cases of willful infringement, recovery of attorney fees is
authorized. 218
The "invention" is not the underlying strategy; it is the "claimed
invention," i.e., limited by the terms set forth in the claim section of the patent.
Note that this means that others could publish articles describing the patented
techniques, lobby for changes to the tax statute or regulations or find other
ways to accomplish the same objectives. None of these activities fall within
the exclusive rights of a patent holder.
V. THE VALUE OF A TAX STRATEGY PATENT

Taking into account all of the above hurdles, the value of a tax strategy
patent appears to be close to zero. To have any significant value, in addition to
being a workable strategy that has economic value, it would need to have three
characteristics:
1. Because of the significant delays in processing patent applications, it
would need to have value over a period of at least three years (the average time
required for USPTO review of an application prior to issuing a patent).
Remedies for patent infringement generally run from the time the patent is
issued, so any strategy that ceased to be effective before the patent issued
would be impossible to license. 219
2. Assuming that the application was filed in the United States. only 220 (a
reasonable, but not necessarily universally applicable assumption), the contents
could be kept secret until the patent issued. However, once the patent issued,
the strategy would be fully disclosed, giving the IRS a clear picture of how any
loopholes might be used.
Therefore, it would need to have value
notwithstanding the IRS's knowledge of its use.
3. Finally, to be valuable, an application would need to meet both of two
inconsistent requirements: it must be non-obvious to clear the patent hurdle,
and it must be sufficiently consistent with Congressional intent to survive the
. 1osure, wh"1ch th e patent statute reqmres.
. 221
d1sc
If the strategy is consistent with Congressional intent (as evidenced by the
statute, regulations, legislative history and pre-application commentary by
others) it is difficult to see how the application could survive the obviousness

217. See id. § 287 (requiring a patent holder to notify the public generally or an infringer specifically in
order to collect damages from that infringer); eBay, Inc., v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)
(indicating that, even in patent cases, the traditional equitable four factor test must be satisfied before a court
grants an injunction).
218. 35 u.s.c. § 285.
219. The one possible licensing avenue--licensing trade secret information-would be foreclosed upon
the publication or issue of the patent because the information would no longer be confidential.
220. If foreign applications were filed, the U.S. application would be subject to pre-grant publication
approximately eighteen months after the patent application has been filed. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(l). Publication
of the application does not constitute the grant of a patent, and therefore does not give the applicant the right to
sue for infringement, although it does trigger certain rights that may be enforced if the patent does issue with
substantially the same claims as those that are published.
221. 35 u.s.c. §§ 103, 112.
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222

hurdle'
On the other hand, if the strategy is meant to subvert congressional intent,
it will need to meet two requirements: it will need to be "adequately disclosed
in the return" and have a "reasonable basis" for the tax treatment claimed; and
it will need to be accepted by the IRS notwithstanding the assumed
inconsistency with congressional intent. 223 In this case, because the patent
must disclose how to make and use the invention, and the inventor's best
contemplated mode of implementing it, 224 both the IRS and Congress will have
a blueprint for promulgating regulations or proposing legislative corrections.
The IRS will also have a guide to look for signs of use of the strategy, which
includes not only the strategy itself, but also the knowledge of which preparer
invented it and who it was assigned to. 225 This paints a bright target for the
IRS, identifying both the strategy to look for and the group of taxpayers most
likely to have used the strategy. In short, a tax strategy patent with a value
much above zero should be a rare event.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Before dismissing the danger of tax strategy patents solely on the basis
that they are likely to have no value, the remaining concerns expressed in the
226
introduction to the Levin bill and by the tax bar should be considered. Those
concerns can be summarized as:
1. There is no need for incentives in this field.
2. Patents issued for aggressive tax strategies may enable unscrupulous
promoters to claim the patent represents an official endorsement of the strategy
and evidence that it would withstand IRS challenge.
3. Patents could be issued for blatantly illegal tax shelters, yet remain in
place for years, producing revenue for the wrongdoers while the IRS battles the
promoters in court.
4. Patents for tax shelters found to be illegal by a court would
nevertheless remain in place, creating confusion among users and possibly
producing illicit income for the patent holder. A related concern is that invalid
patents will be issued by the USPTO and, although there are theoretical
remedies, many will choose to license the patent rather than endure the cost of

222. Even the inventor's own statements can trigger this risk. It is tempting to assume the inventor will
be aware of this risk and file an application before making any potentially damaging statements, but such
statements may be made in the course of debate over final bill language and therefore before it is known which
strategy to apply for.
223. If the IRS (which at this point would have full knowledge of the strategy by virtue of its publication
as a patent) decides that it is not an acceptable position, the test will be difficult to meet, absent a successful
court challenge to the IRS position. See supra notes 86 and 87. Because the strategy is assumed to be
intended to subvert the statutory intent, it is unlikely that the "substantial authority" requirement could be met.
224. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (''The specification shall ... set forth [the] best mode contemplated by the inventor
of carrying out his invention.").
225. The assignee could be disguised by assigning the application to a shell entity, which could then
grant non-exclusive licenses (which are not required to be recorded), but the inventor must appear on the
application papers.
226. S. 681, !lOth Cong. (2007) (as introduced by Sen. Levin).
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challenging it. Dean Aprill reports that "[a]s a result of the difficulties in
identifying prior art, tax practitioners are concerned that many of the patents
that have been or will be issued for tax strategies will inevitably involve
techniques that have long been accepted as routine. Many believe ... that the
SOGRAT™ falls into this category." 227
5. One single tax practitioner who is the first to discover a routine
strategy which provides an advantage could "charge a toll" for all other
taxpayers to use the same strategy, "even though as a matter of public policy
all persons ought to be able to take advantage of the law to minimize their
taxes." 228
The first concern appears to be based on the assumption that tax
professionals are already working as hard as they can to fmd ways to minimize
taxes for their clients. This argument ignores two vital roles that tax strategy
patents fill: they result in making knowledge of the strategy available to the
229
public,
and they provide incentives to innovate, not just to tax planning
professionals (who may, in fact, already have sufficient incentive) but to others
as well. The response to each of the remaining concerns is that the current
system provides solutions:
1. A patent on a tax strategy would no more imply approval by the IRS
than a patent on a drug implied approval by the FDA or a patent on a toy
would imply approval by the Consumer Product Safety Council. Moreover,
the IRS can, through its regulation of tax preparers, prohibit any claim to the
contrary. 230
2. A ~atent on a blatantly illegal process would fail the utility
31
requirement.
The Commissioner of Patents has authority to reexamine any
232
issued patent, and could do so in such a case.
Should the Commissioner fail
to act, any aggrieved party (presumably the IRS would qualify) could
challenge the patent by declaratory judgment action. 233 A finding of invalidity
(or illegality) must be reported to the USPTO and is noted on the patent. 234
3. The subargument that it is expensive to challenge tax strategy patents
and therefore some will pay unnecessary license fees rather than litigate raises
no special issues relating to tax strategy patents. It is possible that USPTO
examination will fail to find critical prior art in any field, 235 resulting in the
227. Aprill, supra note 37 (describing the SOGRAT tax strategy patent, which used stock options to fund
a grantor retained annuity trust).
228. Statement of Senator Carl Levin on Introducing the Stop Tax Haven Act, Part II, Feb. 17, 2007,
http://levin.senate.gov/senate.gov/senate.cfin?id=269543 (last visited July 12, 2008).
229. Tax returns are confidential by Jaw. Thus, the public cannot learn of the strategy by analyzing filed
returns. Notwithstanding the assertion of Dean Aprill that historically tax practitioners have freely shared
strategies, it appears that the current trend is to keep at least some strategies secret, even requiring clients to
sign confidentiality agreements. Aprill, supra note 37, at 19; see, e.g., Andrew Franklin Peterson, Trade
Secrets and Confidentiality: Attorney Ethics in the Silent World of Tax Planning, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 163
(2002).
230. Aprill, supra note 37, at 10.
231. /d. at9.
232. !d. at I 0.
233. !d.
234. !d.
235. See Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's Impact on
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issue of an invalid patent. Thus, if the argument is valid, it leads to the
conclusion that no patents should be granted, not that only tax strategy patents
should not be granted.
4. The final concern is also provided for by the current system, but the
solution is at odds to the one suggested as appropriate by the Senator. The
purpose of the patent statute is to reward those who are the first to invent
something others deem valuable. 236 The person who discovers a valuable
invention and discloses it to the public rather than keeping it secret should be
allowed to "charge a toll" to others who wish to use it. It is not clear why a tax
strategy (in the unlikely event that it met the statutory requirements) should be
treated differently than other inventions. The inventor of the catalytic
converter was allowed to charge such a toll, notwithstanding the public policy
of reducing automotive pollution; drug companies are allowed to charge such a
237
Holding a patent,
toll, notwithstanding the policy of improving health.
whether on a tax strategy a drug or a pollution control device, does not prevent
others from using anything they would otherwise have the right to use-it
requires them to pay a fee 238 for using a tool that was not available to the
239
public or likely to become available but for the act of the inventor.
There are many things short of creating a special exemption for the tax
industry that should reduce the level of concern. Good examination of tax
strategy patents should result in most of them being rejected. A good
examination is more likely to occur if the USPTO is adequately funded, if it
has access to appropriate databases and cooperation from the IRS, if Congress
produces a good legislative history and a clear statute.
The availability of tax strategy patents may in fact help prevent some of
the evils the bill is designed to avoid. By posing the risk that a competitor may
apply for a patent, any developer of a strategy will be discouraged from
keeping the strategy confidential. Publication of the strategy serves the dual
purpose of making it available to more taxpayers in the case of legitimate
strategies, and notifying the IRS of the existence of the strategy so that it can
take steps to deal with unlawful strategies.

Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 90-91 (2006) (reporting that nearly half of patents litigated are found
invalid).
236. Howard T. Markey, Special Problems in Patent Cases, 66 F.R.D. 529,532 (1975).
237. Henry & Turner, supra note 235, at 85.
238. The patent statute provides that an appropriate fee is a "reasonable royalty." 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000)
("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringeme.nt but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,
together with mterest and costs as fixed by the court.").
239. Though the patent statute allows injunctions against infringement, the grant of injunctions rests in
the sound discretion of the trial court, and the Supreme Court has made clear that traditional balance of harm
factors apply. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 388 (2006).

